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ENSURING AN ADEQUATE EDUCATION: 
OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN, LAW, AND 
SOCIAL SCIENCE 
Diana Pullin*
Abstract: The Massachusetts Education Reform Act of 1993 and the deci-
sions of the State’s highest court interpreting the state constitution’s edu-
cation clause are benchmarks in efforts at law-based education reform. 
This article discusses the implications of legislative and judicial mandates 
concerning the provision of education and the extent to which these 
mandates fail to ensure a fair and meaningful opportunity to learn for all 
students. It contrasts the legal mandates with evidence from social science 
literature concerning the conditions that must exist in order to create 
appropriate learning opportunities, particularly for the most at-risk stu-
dent populations. It concludes that law can play a role in creating the 
conditions in local schools for implementing meaningful education re-
form, but that the present statutory requirements are insufªcient and ju-
dicial deference to the legislative branch may result in ongoing achieve-
ment deªcits for the State’s most vulnerable students. 
Introduction 
 Since the middle of the twentieth century, advocates have turned 
to federal and state courts in efforts to provide full and fair educa-
tional opportunities for all the nation’s students.1 During the same 
period, state legislatures and the U.S. Congress adopted a voluminous 
number of statutory incentives and prescriptions concerning the pro-
vision of educational services. All these efforts were marked by an on-
going and still unresolved series of public policy disputes over the role 
                                                                                                                      
* Ph.D, J.D., University of Iowa. Professor of Education Law and Public Policy, Lynch 
School of Education at Boston College, and Afªliate Professor, Boston College Law School. 
1 See generally, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I ), 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Hancock v. 
Comm’r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134 (Mass. 2005); McDuffy v. Sec’y of Exec. Ofªce of Educ., 
615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993); Mark G. Yudof et al., Educational Policy and the Law, 
at xi (3d ed., West Publ’g Co. 1992) (1974); Jay P. Heubert, Six Law-Driven School Reforms: 
Developments, Lessons, and Prospects, in Law & School Reform 1, 2 ( Jay P. Heubert ed., 
1999); Diana Pullin, Whose Schools Are These and What Are They for? The Role of the Rule of Law 
in Deªning Educational Opportunity in American Public Education, in Handbook of Educa-
tional Policy 3 (Gregory J. Cizek ed., 1999). 
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of education in our society; the relationships between local communi-
ties, states, and the federal government; and the balance of powers 
between the legislative and judicial branches of governments.2
 The efforts at law-based education reform have also been con-
tinuously marked by a failure to adequately marry legal claims, judi-
cial decisions, and statutory provisions with the best available educa-
tion and social science evidence and theory concerning the provision 
of educational opportunity.3 Law-based education reform initiatives 
designed to promote equitable and adequate education fail to 
sufªciently address the factors necessary to provide meaningful op-
portunities to learn at the classroom level.4 As a result, the utilization 
of law as a tool for education reform has to date failed to achieve 
meaningful educational attainment by all students. 
 One set of public policy commentators has suggested that the 
fundamental and enduring public policy disputes in education can be 
summarized as: 
• Who should go to school? 
• What are the purposes of education? 
• What should be taught? 
• Who should decide issues of educational policy? 
• Who should pay for education?5 
However, one question missing from efforts to resolve education pol-
icy controversies through law is: How do we ensure every student re-
ceives a fair and effective opportunity to learn? Social science re-
search has made recent strides in identifying the models of teaching 
and characteristics of learning that provide the conditions necessary 
for effective learning opportunities at the school level. In addition, 
recent empirical studies have demonstrated the role that law can play 
                                                                                                                      
2 See Pullin, supra note 1, at 3–4. 
3 See Mary Kennedy, Infusing Educational Decision Making with Research, in Handbook of 
Educational Policy, supra note 1, at 53, 55 (noting that evidence from systematic re-
search and evaluation has not contributed to education policy); see also Pullin, supra note 
1, at 5–6, 20 (describing the proliferation of legal claims and judicial decisions in the past 
ªfty years as representative of society’s ongoing struggle to deªne access to educational 
opportunity). 
4 See Pullin, supra note 1, at 20–22 (noting that courts have struggled to deªne the 
adequacy and sufªciency of educational opportunities). 
5 Robert T. Stout et al., Values: The “What?” of the Politics in Education, in The Study of 
Educational Politics 6 ( Jay D. Scribner & Donald H. Layton eds., 1995); see also Jennifer 
Hochschild & Nathan Scovronick, The American Dream and the Public Schools 2 
(2003) (noting some of the many controversies involved in education disputes). These ques-
tions are also at the heart of educational adequacy lawsuits. See Pullin, supra note 1, at 5–7. 
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in promoting educational reform and attaining educational opportu-
nity.6 Legal attempts at education reform will succeed only to the ex-
tent that legal requirements and remedies effectively address the 
critical social science factors associated with improving educational 
opportunities for all students. 
 Since the landmark decision Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I),7 
education policy disputes and education law initiatives have often fo-
cused on students most at risk of failure in our schools: racial and 
ethnic minority children, children from low-income families and low-
wealth communities, children with disabilities, and children with lim-
ited English proªciency.8 Our system of judge-made and legislated 
education law has struggled with issues of educational governance, 
targeted funding, specialized programs, educator quality, the compo-
nents of instructional programs, and institutional and individual ac-
countability for educational attainment.9 Yet, after over ªfty years of 
law-based education reform, we entered a new century facing contin-
ued failure to educate all our children successfully.10 The role of law 
in promoting education reform and the provision of adequate educa-
tional opportunity has had mixed success. Past lawsuits and legislation 
addressing the provision of educational opportunity have missed op-
portunities to address signiªcantly the fundamental and highly com-
plex issues associated with providing fair and meaningful opportuni-
ties to learn for all students, particularly those most at risk of 
educational failure. 
I. The Courts and an Opportunity to Learn 
 The ªrst signiªcant elementary and secondary school education 
case in federal court was also the ªrst case to address the issue of an 
opportunity to learn.11 In Brown I, the U.S. Supreme Court declared: 
[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state 
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws 
and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate 
                                                                                                                      
6 See discussion infra Part IV. 
7 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I ), 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
8 See, e.g., Hochschild & Scovronick, supra note 5, at ix–x (“[T]he great ºaw in the 
American public school system is its systematic and pervasive denial to poor (and dispro-
portionately non-white) children of the chance to get a good education.”). 
9 See Pullin, supra note 1, at 3–7. 
10 Id. at 25–26. 
11 Brown I, 347 U.S. 483. 
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our recognition of the importance of education to our de-
mocratic society. It is required in the performance of our 
most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed 
forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it 
is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural 
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and 
in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In 
these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be 
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of 
an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has un-
dertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made avail-
able to all on equal terms.12
 In determining that racially separate schools were inherently un-
equal, the Court engaged in one of the judiciary’s earliest forays into 
the use of social science evidence to evaluate educational legal argu-
ments.13 Psychological studies demonstrating pervasive perceptions of 
inferiority among African-American students provided social science 
evidence to support the Court’s determination that separate schools 
were inherently unequal.14
 In Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II ),15 decided a year after 
Brown I, the Court mandated that segregated schools be dismantled 
“with all deliberate speed.”16 In these early cases, the Supreme Court’s 
concept of an opportunity to learn was based on a fairly simple theory: 
schools that educated African-American children with white children 
provided sufªcient opportunities to learn.17 Fifty years of political and 
legal struggle followed.18 Strategies for creating equal educational op-
portunities for minority children grew more sophisticated and varied, 
from busing to building and program enhancement to afªrmative ac-
                                                                                                                      
12 Id. at 493. 
13 Id. at 494 n.11. Footnote eleven in Brown I refers to the works of various social scien-
tists including Effect of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality Development, by Kenneth B. 
Clark, and The Psychological Effects of Enforced Segregation: A Survey of Social Science Opinion, by 
Max Deutscher and Isidor Chein. 
14 Id. at 493–95. 
15 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II ), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
16 Id. at 301. 
17 See id. at 298; Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493–94 (1954). In Brown I, the Court stated: “Does 
segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race . . . deprive the chil-
dren of the minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does.” 
347 U.S. at 493. 
18 See generally Yudof et al., supra note 1, at 469–672 (examining extensively the law of 
equal educational opportunity from Brown I forward). 
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tion in teacher hiring.19 After over ªfty years of desegregation litiga-
tion, courts have mostly ended their jurisdiction over school desegrega-
tion cases, even though commentators argue that the nation’s schools 
are becoming more segregated than ever and that the achievement gap 
between white and minority students persists.20
 In addition to the more traditional types of school desegregation 
cases designed to end dual school systems, enrollment patterns, and 
stafªng issues that have isolated racial minorities, civil rights advocates 
have also utilized the courts to challenge education practices that 
have a disparate impact on minority students as well as an unfair im-
pact on all students.21 These legal challenges have addressed not only 
traditional practices, such as the provision of special education or 
school disciplinary sanctions, but also education reform initiatives.22
 One popular approach to education reform, adopted by both Mas-
sachusetts and the federal government, is the use of high-stakes tests to 
drive education reform.23 Litigation has successfully challenged the use 
of some standardized achievement tests as a requirement for high 
school graduation.24 In the leading case in this area, federal appellate 
courts ruled that state legislatures and public education ofªcials may 
use tests to determine graduation status but must provide an opportu-
nity to learn the content covered on the test, a requirement particularly 
important for African-American students previously forced to attend 
                                                                                                                      
19 See id. at 311, 496. 
20 Erica Frankenberg & Chungmei Lee, The Civil Rights Project Harvard Univ., 
Race in American Public Schools: Rapidly Resegregating School Districts 2 (2002), 
available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/deseg/Race_in_American_ 
Public_Schools1.pdf; Gary Orªeld et al., Dismantling Desegregation: The Quiet Re-
versal of Brown v. Board of Education 130 (1996). See generally Jonathan Kozol, The 
Shame of the Nation: The Restoration of Apartheid Schooling in America (2005). 
21 See Comm. on Appropriate Test Use, Nat’l Research Council, High Stakes: 
Testing for Tracking, Promotion, and Graduation 60–62 ( Jay P. Heubert & Robert 
M. Hauser eds., 1999) [hereinafter High Stakes Testing]; Linda Darling-Hammond, 
From “Separate but Equal” to “No Child Left Behind”: The Collision of New Standards and Old 
Inequalities, in Many Children Left Behind: How the No Child Left Behind Act Is 
Damaging Our Children and Our Schools 3, 7 (Deborah Meier & George Wood eds., 
2004) (describing a California case in which the effect of inadequate facilities in a minor-
ity-dominated middle school was challenged). 
22 See, e.g., Debra P. v. Turlington (Debra I ), 644 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1981) (reviewing a 
challenge to a Florida school reform plan), remanded to 564 F. Supp. 177 (M.D. Fla. 1983), 
aff’d sub nom. Debra P. ex rel Irene P. v. Turlington (Debra II ), 730 F.2d.1405 (11th Cir. 
1984). 
23 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 69, § 1D (2004); High Stakes Testing, supra note 21, at 
13–14; see also text infra accompanying notes 34–37. 
24 See, e.g., Debra I, 644 F.2d 397; Debra II, 730 F.2d 1405. 
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segregated schools.25 The courts based their decisions on the Equal 
Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.26 
Eventually, schools were allowed to proceed with testing as a high school 
graduation requirement on the condition that in the time after the 
high-stakes testing requirements were announced and desegregation 
was implemented, there was evidence that the test covered curricular 
materials students were exposed to in high school and that remediation 
was provided to prepare students for taking or retaking the test.27
II. Legislating Learning Opportunities 
 Courts have recognized obligations under the Equal Protection 
and Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution to ensure that stu-
dents have an opportunity to learn.28 However, courts have not fully 
articulated what kinds of actions schools must take in order to provide 
that opportunity.29 Legislation at both the federal and state levels has 
articulated additional requirements for providing learning opportuni-
ties.30 Examining this legislation provides insight into what legislative 
policymakers believe is required to afford our children opportunites to 
learn. 
                                                                                                                      
25 Debra I, 644 F.2d at 404; Debra II, 730 F.2d at 1407, 1414–17; see John R. Munich, 
High-Stakes Testing: The Next Round of Finance Litigation, 18 Me. Bar J. 202, 204 (2003) (not-
ing that the Debra I decision “set the standards that still govern suits over such high-stakes 
exams”); see also High Stakes Testing, supra note 21, at 21 (stating that the Debra holdings 
offer “an especially clear illustration of a crucial distinction between appropriate and in-
appropriate test use”). 
26 Debra I, 644 F.2d at 402; Debra II, 730 F.2d at 1406–07. 
27 See Debra II, 730 F.2d at 1409, 1415 n.15. Similar decisions on behalf of students with 
limited English proªciency have been based on the federal Equal Educational Opportuni-
ties Act (EEOA). 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1758 (2000); see Flores v. Arizona, 405 F. Supp. 2d 
1112, 1120 (D. Ariz. 2005) (holding that state failure to provide sufªcient funding and 
programs to English language learners denied these students an equal educational oppor-
tunity to pass the state graduation test in violation of EEOA), vacated on other grounds sub 
nom. Flores v. Rzeslawski, No. 06–15378, 2006 WL 2460741 (9th Cir. Aug. 23, 2006). 
28 See, e.g., Debra I, 644 F.2d at 402. 
29 See id. 
30 E.g., No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 
(2002) (to be codiªed as amended primarily in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.); Massachu-
setts Education Reform Act (MERA) of 1993, Mass. Gen. Laws chs. 69–71 (2004). 
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A. The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 
 The new century began with a remarkable bipartisan agreement to 
implement the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB).31 NCLB is 
the largest piece of federal education legislation ever implemented, 
and it sought to increase federal funding to state and local educational 
efforts.32 Additionally, NCLB imposes substantial conditions on receipt 
of federal aid by elementary and secondary schools.33 NCLB marks a 
major change in the federal role in education and a widespread com-
mitment to test-driven, standards-based education reform.34 States must 
comply with NCLB mandates or lose support from the largest source of 
federal funding for elementary and secondary education.35 NCLB re-
quires that states deªne performance standards for districts and hold 
them accountable for compliance.36 Local districts and schools must 
participate in annual student testing and demonstrate “adequate yearly 
progress” (AYP) in improving student test performance.37 Parents are 
given the choice to send their child to another school if their current 
school is unable to meet AYP requirements.38 NCLB also requires states 
to ensure that all teachers are “highly qualiªed,” which is often deter-
mined by teacher competency testing.39 Accountability, parental choice 
intended to create free-market competition, and teacher quality provi-
sions of the statute represent an effort to improve student performance 
nationwide.40
 Among the conditions placed on NCLB funding are requirements 
that educational programs and activities endorsed in the statute be jus-
                                                                                                                      
31 NCLB, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (to be codiªed as amended pri-
marily in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
32 Gail L. Sunderman et al., NCLB Meets School Realities, at ix (2005); James E. 
Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 932, 932 (2004). 
33 Andrew Rudalevige, No Child Left Behind: Forging a Congressional Compromise, in No 
Child Left Behind? 23, 26 (Paul E. Peterson & Martin R. West eds., 2003). 
34 See David T. Conley, Who Governs Our Schools?: Changing Roles and Re-
sponsibilities 27 (2003); Bruce S. Cooper et al., Better Policies, Better Schools 
300 (2004); Frederick M. Hess & Chester E. Finn, Jr., Introduction to Leaving No Child 
Behind 2 (Frederick M. Hess & Chester E. Finn, Jr. eds., 2004); Marine S. Shaul & Harriet 
C. Ganson, The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001: The Federal Government’s Role in Strengthening 
Accountability for Student Performance, 29 Rev. Res. Educ. 151, 152 (2005); Janet Y. Thomas 
& Kevin P. Brady, The Elementary and Secondary Education Act at 40: Equity, Accountability, and 
the Evolving Federal Role in Public Education, 29 Rev. Res. Educ. 51, 55 (2005). 
35 See 20 U.S.C.A. § 6311(g)(2) (West 2003). 
36 Id. § 6311(b). 
37 Id. § 6311(b)(2)(B), (b)(3). 
38 Id. § 6316(b)(1)(A), (E). 
39 Id. § 6319(a); see Thomas & Brady, supra note 34, at 56. 
40 See 20 U.S.C.A. § 6301. 
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tiªed by scientiªc evidence.41 These requirements that programs and 
activities funded under NCLB be evidence-based represent a height-
ened understanding of the meaning of an opportunity to learn and the 
role of social science research in informing law-based educational ap-
proaches.42
 It remains to be seen whether recent legislative and judicial initia-
tives will narrow the achievement gap, ensure meaningful learning op-
portunities, incorporate ongoing opportunities to improve the qualities 
and capabilities of the education professions for continuous improve-
ment, and utilize policy tools that maximize high quality responses by 
educators, students, families at the ground level. 
B. Massachusetts Education Reform Act of 1993 
 Prior to the enactment of NCLB, many states, on their own initia-
tive, legislated education reforms that focused on content standards 
and performance benchmarks to drive local educational accountability 
and improvement.43 Massachusetts offers one useful illustration of the 
impact of judicial and legislative activity on the provision of educational 
opportunity. Eight years prior to the passage of NCLB, Massachusetts 
began allocating billions of dollars in new funding for education pur-
                                                                                                                      
41 See id. § 6316(b)(3)(A)(i) (requiring low-performing local districts that receive fed-
eral funds to develop plans for school improvement that incorporate “strategies based on 
scientiªcally based research that will strengthen the core academic subjects in the school 
and address the speciªc academic issues that caused the school [to be low-performing]”); 
id. § 6316(b)(7)(C)(iv)(I)–(II) (requiring any school failing to make AYP to take, inter alia, 
corrective action, including replacing “school staff who are relevant to the failure to make 
adequate yearly progress” and “providing appropriate professional development . . . that is 
based on scientiªcally based research and offers substantial promise of improving educa-
tional achievement for low-achieving students”); id. § 6511 (providing “ªnancial incentives 
for schools to develop comprehensive school reforms, based upon scientiªcally based re-
search”). The statute sets forth a deªnition for the term “scientiªcally based research” at 
section 7801(37). In many respects, these statutory standards parallel rules of evidence 
adopted by the federal courts. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 
(1993) (creating new standard that scientiªc evidence, to be admissible, must be relevant 
and reliable as determined according to a multi-part test); Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmi-
chael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) (expanding application of Daubert standard to all expert 
testimony). Courts in many states have now adopted similar standards. See, e.g., Canavan’s 
Case, 733 N.E.2d 1042, 1049–50 (Mass. 2000); Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 641 N.E.2d 
1342, 1349 (Mass. 1994). 
42 See Thomas & Brady, supra note 34, at 56–57. 
43 MERA, Mass. Gen. Laws chs. 69–71 (2004); High Stakes Testing, supra note 21, at 
15; Susan H. Fuhrman, Introduction to From the Capitol to the Classroom: Stan-
dards-Based Reform in the States 1, 1 (Susan H. Fuhrman ed., 2001); Munich, supra 
note 25, at 202. 
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suant to the Massachusetts Education Reform Act of 1993 (MERA).44 
At the same time, the legislature set forth a massive set of requirements 
that restructured school ªnance, redeªned the provision of education 
at the local level, established new rules for educator qualiªcation and 
employment, and set up a standards-driven, test-based system of indi-
vidual and institutional accountability.45 This standards-driven system 
required, among other things, that state education ofªcials establish 
curriculum frameworks for schools and institute testing to assess pro-
gress in achieving those curriculum standards.46 Schools were required 
to reach benchmarks of student performance or they would be labeled 
underperforming and possibly reconstituted.47 In many respects, this 
state legislation foreshadowed the requirements enacted later in 
NCLB.48 The State’s years of implementation of MERA also highlight 
some of the problems that will arise across the country in NCLB im-
plementation. 
 Implementation of MERA and increased state funding for schools 
had an impact on the opportunity to learn provided to the State’s stu-
dents. The extent and depth of the impact became a source of public 
policy, educational, and legal disputes.49 After over ten years of educa-
tion reform implementation in Massachusetts, one source of evidence 
on the condition of the State’s schools is data from the State’s Massa-
chusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS) exams.50 While 
test scores have improved over time, in the spring of 2005, eleven per-
                                                                                                                      
44 Act of June 18, 1993, ch. 71, 1993 Mass. Acts 159 (codiªed as amended at Mass. 
Gen. Laws chs. 69–71 (2004)). 
45 See Mass. Gen. Laws chs. 69–71. The statute contained 105 sections and resulted in 
ªfty-four new initiatives on the part of the Massachusetts Department of Education. See 
Mass. Dep’t of Educ., First Annual Implementation Report Executive Summary 
(1994), http://www.doe.mass.edu/edreform/1st_Imp/EXEC.SUMMARY.html. 
46 See High Stakes Testing, supra note 21, at 36, 37. 
47 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 69, § 1J. 
48 Compare 20 U.S.C.A. § 6316(b)(7)–(8) (West 2003) (providing for school “restruc-
turing” in the case of a school that fails to make AYP for a year after being identiªed as 
needing “corrective action”), with Mass Gen. Laws ch. 69, §§ 1J–1K (providing that under-
performing schools failing to demonstrate “signiªcant improvement” be deemed “chroni-
cally under-performing” and reorganized or placed into receivership). 
49 See Hancock v. Comm’r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1137–39 (Mass. 2005) (describ-
ing the history of education reform litigation in Massachusetts). 
50 Caution should be exercised in relying entirely on standardized test scores as evidence 
of educational improvement. There are many considerations that should be taken into ac-
count, including the validity and reliability of the tests themselves, statistical anomalies con-
cerning test scores, instructional practices, and the nature of school-level responses to exter-
nal legal and policy requirements. See generally Uses and Misuses of Data for Educational 
Accountability and Improvement ( Joan L. Herman & Edward H. Haertel eds., 2005). 
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cent of tenth graders performed at the failing level on the English 
Language Arts test, while ªfteen percent of those students performed 
at the failing level on the Mathematics test, though both tests are re-
quired for high school graduation.51 The MCAS results also indicated 
ongoing signiªcant achievement gaps.52 Limited English Proªciency 
(LEP) students, students with disabilities and racial and ethnic minority 
students continue to fall behind, while white students improve at faster 
rates than African-American and Hispanic students.53
 Test performance on the MCAS continues to be low for large 
numbers of disadvantaged students.54 In Boston public schools, while 
overall performance on the MCAS has improved, the gap in achieve-
ment between African-American and Hispanic students and other 
elementary students has not narrowed since the MCAS exams were 
ªrst given in 1998.55 The most recent state-wide MCAS results show 
that, among third graders, overall performance among all students on 
the reading test has remained ºat for the past two years.56
 What the Massachusetts Commissioner of Education referred to as 
“the usual achievement gap” persists.57 Overall, ninety-seven percent of 
white students and ninety-three percent of Asian students passed the 
reading exam.58 However, only seventy-four percent of LEP students, 
eighty-three percent of Hispanic students, eighty-ªve percent of stu-
dents with disabilities, and eighty-seven percent of African-American 
students passed the test.59 The Massachusetts Department of Education 
further reported: 
The performance gap was especially evident when looking at 
the percentage of students who scored Proªcient, the top 
category: 39 percent of African American students scored Pro-
ªcient, as did 63 percent of Asians, 32 percent of Hispanic 
students, 57 percent of Native Americans, 71 percent of white 
                                                                                                                      
51 Mass. Dep’t of Educ., Spring 2005 MCAS Tests Summary of State Results 6 
(2005), available at http://www.doe.mass.edu/mcas/2005/results/summary.pdf. 
52 Id. at 2. 
53 Id. LEP students are students for whom English is not their ªrst language. Id. at 10. 
54 Id. at 1–2. 
55 Tracy Jan, Latinos, Blacks Lag on MCAS, Boston Globe, Jan. 19, 2006, at B1. 
56 Press Release, Mass. Dep’t of Educ., 94 Percent of Third Graders Passed 2005 MCAS 
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students, 37 percent of students with disabilities and 24 per-
cent of limited English proªcient students.60
In the mandatory report on progress that the State provided to the 
federal government in response to NCLB requirements, Massachusetts 
reported that forty-nine percent of the Commonwealth’s schools have 
not improved test scores of black students and forty-six percent of 
schools did not make gains in the scores of their low-income students.61
 In addition to MCAS scores, other sources of evidence provide in-
formation about the Commonwealth’s schools following over ten years 
of MERA implementation.62 For instance, performance on the Scholas-
tic Aptitude Test (SAT), used for college admissions and ªnancial aid 
determinations, reºects disparities in performance between students 
from low property wealth districts as opposed to those from high prop-
erty wealth districts.63 In many low-wealth districts, SAT scores have ac-
tually gone down since the implementation of MERA.64
 The U.S. Bureau of the Census reports an ongoing gap between 
whites and blacks over the age of twenty-ªve in Massachusetts who have 
attained a high school diploma.65 That gap shrank, but just barely, be-
tween 1990 and 2000.66 In 2000, almost a quarter of the State’s black 
population over the age of twenty-ªve had not even attained a high 
school diploma.67 In the post-MERA environment of high-stakes testing 
and accountability, reports of increased dropouts from Massachusetts’s 
schools suggest that further data regarding these gaps may look even 
more discouraging.68 Clearly, the State still confronts many difªculties 
in its quest to provide sufªcient opportunities for all students to learn. 
                                                                                                                      
60 Id. 
61 Megan Tench, Schools Hit on Minority Progress, Boston Globe, Oct. 15, 2004, at B1. 
62 Hancock ex rel Hancock v. Driscoll, No. 02–2978, 2004 WL 877984, at *120–25 
(Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 26, 2004) [hereinafter Hancock Report] (report to the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court by Judge Margot Botsford), recommendation rejected by Hancock v. 
Comm’r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134 (Mass. 2005) (plurality opinion). 
63 Id. at *122. 
64 See id. at *123–24. 
65 Nicole S. Stoops, U.S. Census Bureau, A Half-Century of Learning: His-
torical Statistics on Educational Attainment in the United States, 1940 to 
2000 (2006), http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/education/introphct41. 
html (follow “Tables” hyperlink; then compare Table 7 with Table 11). 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Nat’l Ctr. for Fair & Open Testing & Coal. for Authentic Reform in Educ., MCAS: 
Making the Massacusetts Dropout Crisis Worse, MCAS Alert, Sept. 2000, at 1, available at 
http://www.fairtest.org/care/MCAS%20Alert%20Sept.html. 
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III. Adequacy Litigation in Massachusetts 
A. The McDuffy Case 
 The passage of MERA in 1993 was in part a response to a decision 
by the State’s highest court asserting that the Commonwealth had 
failed to meet its state constitutional obligations to educate its citi-
zens.69 In a clause commonly known as the Education Clause, the Mas-
sachusetts Constitution declares: 
Wisdom, and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused generally 
among the body of the people, being necessary for the pres-
ervation of their rights and liberties; and as these depend on 
spreading the opportunities and advantages of education in 
the various parts of the country, and among the different 
orders of the people, it shall be the duty of legislatures and 
magistrates, in all future periods of this commonwealth, to 
cherish the interests of literature and the sciences, and all 
. . . public schools and grammar schools in the towns . . . .70
Massachusetts is one of many states in which state constitutional provi-
sions regarding elementary and secondary education have been used 
to challenge the inequities in the system of allocating state aid to local 
school districts.71 Plaintiffs in many states have argued that these ineq-
uities in funding make it difªcult for low property wealth districts to 
provide an opportunity to learn.72 The use of state constitutional provi-
sions to challenge the quality of educational opportunities was a reac-
tion to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1973 decision San Antonio Independent 
School District v. Rodriquez, which held that there is no right to education 
protected under the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitu-
tion.73 The resulting wave of state court cases asserted denials of state 
                                                                                                                      
69 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 69, § 1 (2004); McDuffy v. Sec’y of Exec. Ofªce of Educ., 
615 N.E.2d 516, 555 (Mass. 1993). 
70 Mass. Const. pt. 2, ch. V, § II. 
71 See McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 517–18; Paul A. Minorini & Stephen D. Sugarman, Educa-
tional Adequacy in the Courts: The Promise and Problems of Moving to a New Paradigm, in Equity 
and Adequacy in Education Finance 175, 175 (Helen F. Ladd et al. eds., 1999) [herein-
after Minorini & Sugarman, Educational Adequacy]; Paul A. Minorini & Stephen D. 
Sugarman, School Finance Litigation in the Name of Educational Equity: Its Evolution, Impact, 
and Future, in Equity and Adequacy in Education Finance, supra, at 34, 35 [hereinafter 
Minorini & Sugarman, School Finance Litigation]; Aaron J. Saiger, Legislating Accountability: 
Standards, Sanctions, and School District Reform, 46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1655, 1709 (2005). 
72 See Minorini & Sugarman, School Finance Litigation, supra note 71, at 35. 
73 See 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973). 
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equal protection guarantees in the provision of education as required 
by their respective state consitutions; though plaintiffs had mixed suc-
cess in challenging these decisions.74 The next wave of state cases as-
serted that state constitutional provisions on education entitled stu-
dents to a particular level or quality of educational opportunity, 
deemed “suitable,” “thorough and efªcient,” or “adequate” depending 
upon the particular language in a state’s constitution.75 Plaintiffs across 
the country had greater success once they turned to this type of legal 
claim and focused on providing an adequate education and determin-
ing how to calculate and efªciently allocate funds in support of public 
education.76 In Massachusetts, the unique post-Colonial constitutional 
terminology established the duty to “cherish” education.77 The ªrst is-
sue in the Massachusetts litigation was to determine the meaning of the 
term “cherish” and how that terminology related to the provision of 
education.78
 In McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Ofªce of Education, plaintiffs 
from low property wealth school districts argued that the state constitu-
tional provision on education required the Commonwealth to provide 
every young person in the Commonwealth with equal access to an ade-
quate education regardless of the wealth of their district.79 Following a 
remarkable set of stipulations in which the State’s highest educational 
ofªcials and local school superintendents agreed they were not provid-
ing adequate education due to ªnancial constraints, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court determined in 1993 that there was a constitu-
tional duty to provide education.80 Furthermore, the court declared 
that the State’s elected ofªcials had failed to meet their obligations un-
der the Massachusetts Constitution to fund and operate schools capa-
ble of providing an adequate education in order to prepare students to 
function successfully in society.81
 In McDuffy, the court described the constitutional obligation as the 
duty to provide funding sufªcient to prepare educated citizens.82 The 
                                                                                                                      
74 See Saiger, supra note 71, at 1709. 
75 See id. 
76 Allan Odden et al., Rethinking the Finance System for Improved Student Achievement, in 
American Educational Governance on Trial 82, 83–84 (William Lowe Boyd & Debra 
Miretzky eds., 2003). 
77 See Mass. Const. pt. 2, ch. V, § II. 
78 See McDuffy v. Sec’y of Exec. Ofªce of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 523–24 (Mass. 1993). 
79 Id. at 523, 524. 
80 Id. at 553–55. 
81 Id. at 553–54. 
82 Id. at 555. 
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court did not establish criteria for providing an opportunity to learn, 
but instead described the outcomes of an adequate education: 
An educated child must possess “at least the seven following 
capabilities: (i) sufªcient oral and written communication 
skills to enable students to function in a complex and rapidly 
changing civilization; (ii) sufªcient knowledge of economic, 
social, and political systems to enable students to make in-
formed choices; (iii) sufªcient understanding of governmental 
processes to enable the student to understand the issues that 
affect his or her community, state, and nation; (iv) sufªcient 
self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and physi-
cal wellness; (v) sufªcient grounding in the arts to enable each 
student to appreciate his or her cultural and historical heri-
tage; (vi) sufªcient training or preparation for advanced train-
ing in either academic or vocational ªelds so as to enable each 
child to choose and pursue life work intelligently; and (vii) suf-
ªcient level of academic or vocational skills to enable public 
school students to compete favorably with their counterparts 
in surrounding states, in academics or in the job market.”83
 The court deferred to the legislature to determine how to pro-
ceed.84 The same week, the legislature passed MERA and public ofªcials 
and state and local educators began implementation of the statute.85
B. The Hancock Case 
 Following six years of implementation of MERA, plaintiffs re-
opened the original McDuffy litigation. The case, recaptioned Hancock 
v. Driscoll, examined four low property wealth “focus districts,” contrast-
ing them with three high property wealth “comparison districts.”86 
Plaintiffs argued that the Commonwealth was still failing to meet its 
state constitutional obligation to provide adequate elementary and sec-
ondary education.87 The Hancock case was referred to a trial court 
                                                                                                                      
83 McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 554 (quoting Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 
S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989)). 
84 Id. at 554 n.92. 
85 Act of June 18, 1993, ch. 71, 1993 Mass. Acts 159 (codiªed as amended at Mass. 
Gen. Laws chs. 69–71 (2004)); see supra text accompanying Part II.B. 
86 Hancock Report, supra note 62, at *4. The four focus districts were Brockton, Lowell, 
Springªeld, and Winchendon. Id. The comparison districts were Brookline, Concord/Car- 
lisle, and Wellesley. Id. 
87 Id. at *1. 
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judge to report proposed ªndings and conclusions to the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court.88
1. The Proposed Findings in Hancock 
 Few would argue that judges and lawmakers in Massachusetts 
were not well-intending or that the MERA requirements have not had 
a widespread impact on schools. Yet Judge Botsford of the state trial 
court reported to the Supreme Judicial Court in 2004 that she found 
a deep and widespread failure to educate many disadvantaged stu-
dents in low-wealth school districts.89 She indicated that this failure to 
meet the constitutional obligations to educate was based on several 
factors: state funding of education, curriculum, educator quality, test 
scores and other indicators of educational success, and the nature of 
the constitutional duty to educate.90
a. Funding of Education 
 In 1993, the McDuffy court determined that inadequacies in state 
funding for low property wealth school districts unconstitutionally 
impaired access to educational opportunity for students in those dis-
tricts.91 However, the court explicitly refused to deªne or mandate a 
particular level of state funding for education, leaving the determina-
tion to the legislature.92 When the legislature adopted MERA after the 
McDuffy decision, it adopted a new formula for allocating state educa-
tional aid.93 Along with other educational requirements, MERA in-
creased appropriations, which resulted in an infusion of billions of 
dollars in new funding for Massachusetts public elementary and sec-
ondary schools in low property wealth districts.94 These changes were 
substantial and the impact on low-wealth districts was considerable.95
                                                                                                                      
88 Id.; Hancock v. Comm’r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1145 (Mass. 2005). 
89 Hancock Report, supra note 62, at *143. At the time of Judge Botsford’s ªndings, 
MERA had been in effect for over ten years. Id. at *8. 
90 Id. at *143, *145. 
91 See McDuffy v. Sec’y of Exec. Ofªce of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 552 (Mass. 1993). 
92 Id. at 519. 
93 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 70 (2004); Hancock Report, supra note 62, at *5. 
94 See Hancock Report, supra note 62, at *8, *143. 
95 See id. at *143. For example, Judge Botsford noted that, as a result of MERA, “Win-
chendon’s actual net school spending . . . almost tripled [between 1993 and 2003], from 
approximately $5.78 million to almost $14 million, while its enrollment over this period of 
time increased but certainly did not triple.” Id. at *95. 
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 However, even with the infusion of substantial new state resources 
into low-wealth districts as a result of MERA, Judge Botsford found that 
high-performing districts spend, on average, 130% of the state-man-
dated foundation, or minimum budget, and almost 200% of the foun-
dation budget for teacher salaries after MERA’s funding increases.96 In 
contrast, between 2001 and 2003, the four focus districts were found to 
have spent just slightly more than 100% of the state-mandated founda-
tion budget, and “teaching salary expenditures were generally much 
closer to the amount . . . allocated . . . in the formula.”97 Since the pas-
sage of MERA, pressures on the state budget due to the economic cli-
mate and a state tax cut actually resulted in overall reductions in state 
aid to education.98 Some of those programs that experienced funding 
reductions were particularly critical to education reform efforts: class 
size reduction grants, support for remedial education for students fail-
ing the MCAS, and early intervention and early childhood services.99 
After MERA passed, there were no legislative adjustments of the school 
ªnance formula, which determined the minimum costs of educating 
students, to take into account the cost increases associated with the new 
curriculum, testing, and other programs added as a result of MERA.100
                                                                                                                      
96 Id. at *123 & n.156, *127 & n.164. 
97 See id. at *122–23, *127 n.164. 
98 See Hancock v. Comm’r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1174 & n.3 (Mass. 2005) (Ire-
land, J., dissenting). 
99 See Hancock Report, supra note 62, at *127–28. Judge Botsford reported: “The high 
water mark of State funding for public school education programs was in FY02. The next 
two ªscal years saw reductions, and those in FY04 were substantial.” Id. at *128. In addition 
to the reductions in state aid through the state’s foundation formula for funding local 
schools, 
several signiªcant grant programs were drastically cut in FY04: 
• Class size reduction grants . . . were eliminated entirely . . . ; 
• MCAS remediation grants were reduced from $50 million in both FY03 and FY02 
to $10 million for FY04 . . . ; 
• Grants for public school preschool and other early childhood education pro-
grams were also greatly cut, for the third year in a row. Thus these grant funds 
went from a high of $114.5 million in FY01 to $103.4 million in FY02, to $94.6 
million in FY03, and ªnally, down to $74.6 million in FY04; 
• Early literacy grants for early reading programs were also cut by two-thirds, from 
$18.3 million in FY03 to $3.8 million in FY04. 
Id. at *129. 
100 See id. at *126. 
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b. School Curriculum 
 One of the primary components of the MERA reform in 1993 was 
the requirement that the State Board of Education, in consultation with 
educators and the public, write a series of curriculum frameworks to 
deªne the essential knowledge necessary for elementary and secondary 
students.101 These frameworks were to address each of the content ar-
eas of mathematics, English and language arts, science, and social stud-
ies.102 Additionally, these frameworks were to deªne the coverage of the 
MCAS examinations, though to date, only the mathematics and Eng-
lish/language arts tests have been fully implemented.103 Judge Botsford 
found that the MCAS and its accompanying curriculum framework 
standards were regarded by many national education commentators as 
among the most ambitious in the country, and she recognized that the 
frameworks corresponded to the seven McDuffy standards.104
 The MERA framers hoped that the formulation of curriculum 
frameworks, coupled with testing requirements, would cause local 
schools and educators to behave differently to achieve educational re-
form.105 However, Judge Botsford’s proposed ªndings in the Hancock 
case indicate that the legislature’s model of reform did not necessarily 
work because several low-wealth districts had great difªculty imple-
menting the curriculum frameworks.106 For example, one low-wealth 
district was cited for using an outdated elementary school reading se-
ries that neither met NCLB requirements for “scientiªcally-based cur-
ricula” nor matched the district’s curriculum goals.107 In another ex-
ample from the low property wealth district of Springªeld, the local 
mathematics curriculum was aligned with the state curriculum frame-
works, but Judge Botsford found that many math teachers in the dis-
trict did not have the experience and skills to teach the inquiry and 
problem solving approaches mandated by those frameworks.108
                                                                                                                      
101 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 69, § 1D (2004). 
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c. Educator Quality 
 Both NCLB and MERA recognize that improving educator quality 
is an essential component of education reform. The Commonwealth’s 
Commissioner of Education likewise described teacher quality as the 
critical variable in improving student achievement.109 While both stat-
utes set out new conditions for ensuring teacher quality,110 researchers 
have also described the characteristics of teachers sufªciently prepared 
to educate students.111 For example, one of the nation’s preeminent 
researchers on teacher quality, Dr. Linda Darling-Hammond, described 
the criteria for judging teacher quality as the “teacher’s verbal ability, 
level of substantive knowledge in the ªeld he or she teaches, capacity to 
make content available to students at different levels, and knowledge of 
teaching methods.”112
 Judge Botsford also discussed the importance of teacher quality, 
particularly for the most high risk students.113 She found that hiring 
and retaining qualiªed educators in low property wealth districts is es-
pecially challenging.114 In the four low property wealth districts pro-
ªled in the Hancock case, a signiªcant proportion of both teachers and 
administrators were not certiªed or licensed by the State.115 In Win-
chendon, for example, one-third of the district’s administrators (three 
of nine) were not licensed, and approximately 11% of its teachers were 
not licensed or were teaching out of ªeld in the fall of 2002.116 Also, 
75% of seventh and eighth grade math teachers and approximately 
20% of ninth through twelfth grade math teachers in Winchendon 
lacked appropriate certiªcation in 2001.117 In Brockton, around 10% 
                                                                                                                      
109 Id. at *134 (citing testimony of Dr. David Driscoll). 
110 20 U.S.C.A. § 6601 (West 2003); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 69, § 1J (2004). 
111 Hancock Report, supra note 62, at *134. 
112 Id. (citing testimony of Dr. Linda Darling-Hammond). 
113 Id. at *135. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at *134. Note that educators are not technically licensed by states, but are in-
stead certiªed. Certiªcation does not consist of the exclusive ability to provide the service 
of educating, since states like Massachusetts do not require state credentials of any sort for 
individuals to teach in private schools or to engage in homeschooling. See Linda Darling-
Hammond, Standard Setting in Teaching: Changes in Licensing, Certiªcation, and Assessment, in 
Handbook of Research on Teaching 751, 751–52 (Virginia Richardson ed., 4th ed. 
2001) (reviewing changing standards for teacher education, licensing, and certiªcation); 
Diana Pullin, Key Questions in Implementing Teacher Testing and Licensing, 30 J.L. & Educ. 383, 
395–97 (2001) (distinguishing teacher certiªcation from teacher licensing). 
116 Hancock Report, supra note 62, at *134 n.184. 
117 Id. at *108. 
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of teachers and 12% of administrators were not licensed at all.118 At the 
junior high school level, 50% of the junior high school math teachers 
were not appropriately certiªed in 2001.119 By 2002 to 2003, 35% of the 
math teachers were still not appropriately certiªed in mathematics.120 
Only 32% of Lowell’s middle school math teachers and only 47% of its 
middle school social studies teachers were certiªed in their respective 
ªelds.121 In 2002, Springªeld employed 2639 teachers, 12% of whom 
were not licensed at all.122
 Judge Botsford highlighted the essential role qualiªed administra-
tors (particularly school principals) can play in providing fair and 
meaningful opportunities to learn.123 She discussed the considerable 
variability in school quality that can occur within a school district.124 
For example, she noted that the Springªeld school district had so many 
low-performing schools that it was, overall, a low-performing district.125 
However, Springªeld also had some of the highest-performing individ-
ual urban schools in Massachusetts.126 She found that “[s]chool leader-
ship and the capacity of the principal and faculty to instill a culture of 
student achievement were important reasons cited by the superinten-
dent for the stark performance differences seen among these two 
groups of schools.”127 Clearly, Judge Botsford understood the impor-
tance of educator quality in ensuring access to meaningful educational 
opportunity.128
d. Outcomes Measures for Education Reform 
 While Judge Botsford’s discussion of curriculum and educator 
qualiªcations demonstrated a more nuanced understanding of the 
complexities associated with providing a fair and meaningful opportu-
nity to learn, she seemed to accept at face value the use of MCAS scores 
as evidence of the success of MERA’s education reforms.129 In her re-
port, Judge Botsford determined that MCAS test score results repre-
                                                                                                                      
118 Id. at *134 n.184. 
119 Id. at *42. 
120 Id. 
121 Hancock Report, supra note 62, at *62, *64. 
122 Id. at *90. 
123 See id. at *27. 
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125 Id. at *32. 
126 Hancock Report, supra note 62, at *27. 
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128 See id. at *134–35. 
129 See id. at *113. 
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sented an acceptable means for determining school and district per-
formance, a basis for determining whether education programs were 
minimally adequate.130 Overall, Judge Botsford reported that MCAS 
scores in the focus low-wealth districts improved from 2002 to 2003.131 
But at the same time, she used MCAS scores to demonstrate problems 
with the provision of adequate education in the low-wealth districts. 
 As one example of the use of MCAS scores to assess problems in 
the provision of an adequate education in the Winchendon district, 
Judge Botsford noted that the district’s MCAS scores were among the 
lowest in the state.132 Another method for assessing the results of test-
based education reform is to review the rates at which students drop 
out of school.133 Judge Botsford found that the dropout rates for low-
wealth districts were higher than rates for the state as a whole.134
                                                                                                                      
 
130 Id. Since the only MCAS tests being given at the time were in mathematics and Eng-
lish/language arts, there was no test score data on the other subjects covered by the cur-
riculum frameworks. See id. Judge Botsford also noted that the determination of a “pass-
ing” score on MCAS was actually based upon a student attaining a score at the level of 
“needs improvement” rather than “proªcient.” Id. 
131 Hancock Report, supra note 62, at *113. 
132 Id. at *37. Judge Botsford stated: 
[T]he MCAS scores for Winchendon are very low, particularly for a non-
urban system with a population that includes almost no minority or LEP stu-
dents. The [English language arts] scores show very little improvement over 
the years. In 2003, 64% of grade 10 students scored in the Needs Improve-
ment or Failing categories on the MCAS English language arts test, and 62% 
of grade 4 students did so. In math, the actual failure rate went down sig-
niªcantly between 1998 and 2003, but in 2003, 73% of tenth graders still 
scored in the combined Needs Improvement or Failing category, and the 
same was true of fourth graders. In 2003, 83% of the grade 8 students were in 
the Needs Improvement or Warning/Failing category on the science MCAS 
test, and 56% of ªfth graders were in the same predicament. In history for 
eighth grade students in 2002, 95% scored in the Needs Improvement or 
Warning/Failing categories. As is true in the other three focus districts, there 
are substantial gaps between the MCAS performance of special education or 
low income students and that of regular education students. 
Id. The Judge noted that in the previous year: 
52.5% of Winchendon’s students on the [English language arts] test and 
79.8% of the students on the math test, scored in the Needs Improvement 
and Warning/Failing categories. These scores were 12.3 percentage points in 
[English language arts] and 19.4 percentage points in math more than the 
State average percentages for Needs Improvement and Warning/Failing. 
Id. at *111. 
133 Id. at *113, *115–16. 
134 Id. at *116. Judge Botsford cited the State’s own data for each district and concluded: 
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 Though Judge Botsford recognized that some improvements could 
be identiªed, she focused on the key issue framed by the state defen-
dants in the case.135 State defendants asked, “Do the instructional pro-
grams provided by the district’s schools in each core subject area, at 
each grade level, meet the educational needs of all students and result 
in steadily improving student achievement?”136 Her response: 
[N]o. While it is certainly true that MCAS scores in the focus 
districts have improved, these four districts’ scores are still 
much lower than the State average, not to speak of the com-
parison districts. As for the other criteria discussed—dropout 
data, retention rates, graduation rates, SAT scores, post-secon- 
dary school plans—with few exceptions, the four focus dis-
tricts have not improved at all, and if one concentrates par-
ticularly on the last ªve years, when one would expect at least 
to begin seeing the impact of [M]ERA investments, there are 
almost no exceptions.137
Judge Botsford’s report noted the gains in MCAS scores in low-wealth 
districts, yet looked at the larger picture, including state MCAS aver-
ages and graduation rates, to conclude that those students were not 
yet receiving an adequate education.138
e. The Duty to Educate 
 The report to the Supreme Judicial Court provided by Judge Bots-
ford was extremely detailed, thoughtful, and thorough.139 After hearing 
                                                                                                                      
The department’s projected four-year dropout rates for the four focus districts 
are substantially higher than the annual dropout rates in the [state]. For the 
class of 2003, for example, the department projected a four year dropout rate 
(that is, ninth through twelfth grades for that class) as follows: Brockton–20%; 
Lowell–37%; Springªeld–21%; Winchendon–17%. For the class of 2004, the 
four year projections are as follows: Brockton–20%; Lowell–33%; Springªeld–
28%; Winchendon–21%. The projections for the comparison [high-wealth] dis-
tricts are much lower: for Brookline, Concord-Carlisle and Wellesley, the four 
year dropout rates for both 2003 and 2004 were 1% with one exception (Welles-
ley’s projected rate for 2004 was 2%). 
Id. at *116 n.143 (citations omitted). 
135 Id. at *117–18. 
136 Hancock Report, supra note 62, at *117. 
137 Id. at *118. 
138 See id. at *113, *118. 
139 Hancock v. Comm’r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1138 (Mass. 2005) (Marshall, C.J., 
concurring) (describing Judge Botsford’s ªndings of fact as “thoughtful and detailed”). 
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114 witnesses and reviewing more than 1000 exhibits, the ªnal report 
she submitted spanned 318 pages.140 The report, powerful in both its 
analysis and conclusions, covered indicators of both the inputs into the 
State’s school districts and the outputs from that system. Judge Botsford 
focused her report on the seven capabilities identiªed in McDuffy as the 
benchmark against which to measure the sufªciency of the State’s ef-
forts.141 She concluded, 
The Commonwealth, and the department, have accomplished 
much over the past ten years in terms of investing enormous 
amounts of new money in local educational programs, ensur-
ing a far greater degree of equitable spending between rich 
and poor school districts, and redesigning in some fundamen-
tal ways the entire public school educational program. When 
one looks at the State as a whole, there have been some im-
pressive results in terms of improvement in overall student 
performance. Nevertheless, the factual record establishes that 
the schools attended by the plaintiff children are not cur-
rently implementing the Massachusetts curriculum frame-
works for all students, and are not currently equipping all stu-
dents with the McDuffy capabilities.142
 While MCAS scores were a primary focus, the judge reported that 
the problem was broader and deeper than what could be represented 
by test scores, extending across all the subject areas and severely im-
pacting students from low-income families, racial and ethnic minority 
children, students with learning disabilities, and those with limited 
English proªciency.143 The remedy Judge Botsford proposed was an 
order requiring the Commonwealth to follow the model set forth in 
the New York adequacy litigation where a public commission deter-
mines, and then the legislature provides, the costs required to permit 
every student the opportunity to acquire the McDuffy capabilities.144
                                                                                                                      
140 Id. at 1146. 
141 Hancock Report, supra note 62, at *16; see McDuffy v. Sec’y of Exec. Ofªce of Educ., 
615 N.E.2d 516, 554–55 (Mass. 1993); see also supra text accompanying note 83. 
142 Hancock Report, supra note 62, at *143. 
143 Id. 
144 See id. at *145 (citing Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. New York, 801 N.E.2d 326, 
344–50 (N.Y. 2003)). Subsequently, New York’s highest state court reafªrmed its holding 
that the state constitution required the State to provide a sound basic education, but held 
that determination of these costs rested exclusively with the legislative and executive 
branches unless they act unreasonably or irrationally. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. 
State, 2006 N.Y. Slip Op. 08630, 2006 WL 3344731 (N.Y. Nov. 20, 2006). 
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2. The Judgment in the Hancock Case 
 Upon its completion, Judge Botsford submitted her report to the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court for review. The court accepted 
the report, expressing great deference to Judge Botsford’s ªndings.145 
A plurality of the court, however, completely rejected both her con-
clusions concerning the widespread failures to educate students in 
low-wealth districts and her recommendations.146 The court con-
cluded that the State’s educational system had improved markedly 
since MERA was implemented and that, while shortcomings still ex-
isted, they did not amount to the “egregious . . . abandonment” of 
state responsibility found in McDuffy.147 Instead, the court determined 
that while “serious inadequacies in public education remain . . . the 
Commonwealth is moving systemically to address those deªciencies 
and continues to make education reform a ªscal priority.”148
 The court reafªrmed the holding in McDuffy and ruled that the 
elected ofªcials of the Commonwealth were not required to take any 
further steps to meet their obligations under the Massachusetts Consti-
tution to provide an adequate education to the State’s children.149 
However, in a concurring opinion, two justices indicated that they were 
inclined to either overturn or limit the original McDuffy holding.150 
Furthermore, two dissenting justices asserted that the consequence of 
the plurality opinion was a repudiation of the McDuffy holding.151
 While the justices found that there are still signiªcant educa-
tional problems in Massachusetts, their decision in Hancock relied on 
several critical determinations.152 The plurality opinion embraced the 
enactment of MERA: 
The act . . . radically restructured the funding of public edu-
cation across the Commonwealth based on uniform criteria of 
need, and dramatically increased the Commonwealth’s man-
                                                                                                                      
145 Hancock v. Comm’r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1138 (Mass. 2005). The court stated 
that “[Judge Botsford’s] ªndings will stand as a compelling, instructive account of the 
current state of public education in Massachusetts.” Id. at 1147. 
146 Id. at 1155–58. 
147 Id. at 1138. 
148 Id. at 1139. 
149 Id. at 1136–37. 
150 Hancock v. Comm’r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1159–60 (Mass. 2005) (Cowin, J., 
concurring) ( joined by Sosman, J.). Justice Cowin described McDuffy as “a display of stun-
ning judicial imagination” that should be overruled. Id. at 1160 (Cowin, J., concurring). 
151 See id. at 1171 (Greaney, J., dissenting); id. at 1175 (Ireland, J., dissenting). 
152 See discussion infra Part III.B.2.a–e. 
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datory ªnancial assistance to public schools. The act also es-
tablished, for the ªrst time in Massachusetts, uniform, objec-
tive performance and accountability measures for every pub-
lic school student, teacher, administrator, school, and district 
in Massachusetts.153
MERA’s “sweeping reach,” as the court described it, and the infusion, at 
least in previous economic good times, of billions of new dollars of state 
aid to local education sufªciently indicated to the Supreme Judicial 
Court that the State’s constitutional requirement to “cherish” educa-
tion was being met.154 MERA’s system of using objective, data-driven 
performance assessment and accountability was persuasive evidence to 
the court that the State was not “acting in an arbitrary, nonresponsive, 
or irrational way” in meeting the constitutional obligation.155
 Just as Judge Botsford had done, the Supreme Judicial Court’s 
consideration of issues related to an opportunity to learn took into ac-
count issues of funding, curriculum, educator quality, and outcomes 
measures.156 However, the conclusions the justices reached, and the 
bases for drawing these conclusions, were notably different. 
a. Funding of Education 
 The Supreme Judicial Court’s discussion in Hancock hinged on 
deference to the Governor and legislature to determine the allocation 
of ªnancial resources.157 This deference, coupled with the weak stan-
dard of judicial review of legislative and executive branch activities 
adopted by the court, help to explain the outcome in Hancock.158 Jus-
tice Marshall’s plurality opinion indicates that many of the justices 
viewed the case as primarily a debate about funding.159 This placed 
the matter in the hands of the legislature because of the court’s view 
that the legislature holds ultimate authority regarding resource alloca-
tion.160 In the face of generally increased levels of school funding de-
                                                                                                                      
153 Hancock, 822 N.E.2d at 1138 (plurality opinion). 
154 See id. at 1141. 
155 Id. at 1140, 1142. 
156 Compare discussion supra Part III.B.1.a–e (analyzing the approach of Judge Bots-
ford), with discussion infra Part III.B.2.a–e (analyzing the approach of the Supreme Judi-
cial Court in the Hancock decision). 
157 See Hancock, 822 N.E.2d at 1156–57. 
158 See id. at 1146, 1156–57. 
159 See id. at 1157–58; id. at 1164 (Cowin, J., concurring) (“[T]he controversy before us 
today is largely a funding debate.”). 
160 See id. at 1156–57 (plurality opinion). 
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signed to minimize differences attributable to local property wealth 
and in the absence of any other constitutional violations, the court 
found that the Commonwealth was not violating the state Education 
Clause.161 The magnitude of new funding allocated to local schools, as 
noted by Judge Botsford, was very persuasive to the court.162 Though 
the court also noted drastic cuts in state funding in the two most re-
cent budget years, the justices did not ªnd them troubling when de-
termining the outcome of the case.163
b. School Curriculum 
 The Supreme Judicial Court’s determinations about funding and 
the standards to employ when assessing the constitutional duty to 
provide education allowed the court to avoid a detailed consideration 
of issues concerning curriculum in the schools as Judge Botsford had 
done.164 However, the plurality opinion addressed curriculum and the 
outcomes of schooling in some detail.165
 The court noted that the State’s curriculum frameworks are of ex-
cellent quality and a reasonable representation of what students needed 
if they were to achieve the seven McDuffy capabilities.166 Justice Mar-
shall’s plurality opinion also went so far as to endorse the curriculum 
frameworks as providing appropriate pedagogical approaches.167
c. Educator Quality 
 The Supreme Judicial Court was also very supportive of the 
State’s efforts to enhance educator quality.168 In particular, the court 
endorsed those initiatives associated with eliminating teacher tenure 
                                                                                                                      
161 Id. at 1152–53. 
162 See Hancock, 822 N.E.2d at 1147. Indeed, the court almost sarcastically noted that 
“[n]o one reading the judge’s report can be left with any doubt that the question is not ‘if’ 
more money is needed, but how much.” Id. at 1157. 
163 Id. at 1148. But see id. at 1174 (Ireland, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that 
“McDuffy did not envision that this constitutional duty would be subject to the vagaries of 
budget issues”). 
164 See discussion supra Part III.B.1.b. 
165 See Hancock, 822 N.E.2d at 1142–43 (plurality opinion). 
166 Id. at 1151. 
167 See id. at 1142 n.10. Many educators and education researchers might contest 
whether the State’s curriculum frameworks actually include sufªcient representation of 
how to teach the content covered in the frameworks. 
168 See id. at 1144 & n.13. 
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and improving teacher certiªcation requirements.169 Consistent with 
the court’s superlative ratings for the State’s various MERA implemen-
tation efforts, the Hancock decision also applauded the State’s teacher 
competency tests and credentialing regulations as “among the most 
rigorous teacher qualiªcation programs in the United States.”170
d. Outcomes Measures for Education Reform 
 The use of outcomes measures to determine whether the Com-
monwealth’s constitutional duty regarding education is being met was 
ªrst outlined in the McDuffy decision through that decision’s descrip-
tion of the characteristics of an educated citizen.171 However, in the 
subsequent Hancock decision, the Supreme Judicial Court seemed to 
suggest that the McDuffy capabilities imposed goals that were too lofty 
given the constitutional requirement.172 Instead, the Hancock decision 
noted with approval the general improvement over time in MCAS ex-
amination scores.173 The plurality opinion also ªrmly rejected the con-
clusion by two of the dissenting justices that the results of the State’s 
efforts to improve achievement were insufªcient.174 In fact, Justice Mar-
shall’s plurality opinion seemed to assume that it is not surprising, and 
perhaps even inevitable, that some school districts would continue to 
be low performing.175
 The metric for determining success is also worth considering. 
Commentators have noted elsewhere that there is an incentive for states 
to set the performance bar low under NCLB and state systems in order 
to appear to be making progress.176 It has even been suggested that 
                                                                                                                      
 
169 Id. at 1144. Note, however, that commentators have described how the MERA re-
quirements, as implemented, did little to change approaches concerning low-performing 
teachers and may, in fact, have had the reverse effect. See e.g., Henry G. Stewart & Sally L. 
Adams, Arbitration of Teacher Dismissals and Other Discipline Under the Education Reform Act, 83 
Mass. L. Rev. 18, 32 (1998). 
170 Hancock, 822 N.E.2d at 1151 (internal quotations omitted). 
171 See supra text accompanying note 83. 
172 The court stated: “One scholar notes of these ‘capabilities’ that, ‘[i]f this standard 
is taken literally, there is not a public school system in America that meets it.’” Hancock, 822 
N.E.2d at 1153 n.29 (quoting William E. Thro, A New Approach to State Constitutional Analy-
sis in School Finance Litigation, 14 J.L. & Pol. 525, 548 (1998)). 
173 Id. at 1150. 
174 Id. at 1151–52. 
175 See id. at 1139, 1154–56. 
176 See Ryan, supra note 32, at 934, 953–54 (arguing that NCLB creates “shaming sanc-
tions” through the use of the label “low performing” for schools and utilizes incentives that 
actually work against their achievement by unintentionally encouraging states to lower 
their academic standards, promoting school segregation and the pushing out of poor and 
minority students, and discouraging good teachers from taking jobs in challenging class-
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states may further lower the bar over time as NCLB’s requirement for 
100% proªciency for all students by 2014 nears.177 In fact, in Massachu-
setts, successful completion of the MCAS test required not “proªciency,” 
but instead only a score falling in the “needs improvement” range.178
e. The Duty to Educate 
 To the plurality of the court in Hancock, the constitutional duty to 
educate imposed upon the legislature and elected ofªcials seems to 
consist of the duty to make a concerted effort to provide funding to lo-
cal districts, coupled with directives and accountability obligations for 
the operation of local schools.179 The court found that the legislature 
and public ofªcials in Massachusetts engaged in a “responsive, sus-
tained, intense legislative commitment to public education.”180 Given 
the court’s statement of deference to the legislature and elected ofªcials 
in providing education, this accolade seems to capture the court’s per-
ception of the nature of the duty imposed.181 The plurality opinion fur-
ther praises the State’s efforts as revolutionary in wisdom and quality.182
 The concurrence by Justice Cowin, joined by Justice Sosman, ar-
gued that the McDuffy holding read too much into the Education 
Clause and viewed the constitutional duty as very limited in scope, cre-
ating only broad directives with great discretion for the legislative and 
executive branches.183 These justices clearly believed courts should not 
become involved in education policy, as they noted the importance of 
separation of powers and judicial restraint in these matters.184
                                                                                                                      
 
rooms). Abigail Ternstrom, member of the Massachusetts Board of Education and a strong 
supporter of standards-based testing, “call[ed] the goal of one hundred percent 
proªciency in twelve years ‘ludicrous’ and suggest[ed] that it [could] only be accom-
plished, at least in Massachusetts, by deªning ‘proªciency way down . . . way, way down.’” 
Id. at 945 n.64. 
177 Id. at 947–48. 
178 Hancock Report, supra note 62, at *9. In October of 2006, the Massachusetts Board of 
Education revised the score requirement; passing now requires either a score of “proªciency” 
on the test or a score of “needs improvement,” coupled with the completion of an “Educa-
tional Proªciency Plan.” 603 Mass. Code Regs. 30.03(2) (2006); Press Release, Mass. Dep’t 
of Educ., New MCAS Regulations Require All Students to Strive for Proªciency (Oct. 24, 
2006), http://www.doe.mass.edu/news/news.asp?id=3120. 
179 Hancock, 822 N.E.2d at 1157–58. 
180 Id. at 1154. 
181 Id. at 1157. 
182 See id. at 1144. 
183 See id. at 1159, 1160 (Cowin, J., concurring). 
184 See Hancock, 822 N.E.2d at 1160–61 (Cowin, J., concurring). These interpretations 
of the state’s constitutional duty in Hancock follow decisions by the Supreme Judicial Court 
subsequent to McDuffy limiting the scope of the language imposing a duty to cherish edu-
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 Yet two justices dissented strongly from the plurality and concur-
ring opinions in Hancock, characterizing the constitutional duty to cher-
ish education more broadly and claiming that the majority of the jus-
tices, in effect, overruled McDuffy.185 These two justices asserted that 
the plurality recast the duty to cherish education as a mere “aspira-
tion.”186 To the dissenters, results were the key to assessing whether the 
duty was being met.187 However, the dissenters also suggested that while 
equal outcomes on such measures as MCAS or graduation rates are not 
guaranteed, the constitutional obligation required that students be af-
forded “a reasonable opportunity to acquire an adequate education, 
within the meaning of McDuffy, in the public schools of their communi-
ties.”188 The dissenting opinions took a stance similar to that taken by 
Judge Botsford. As Justice Greaney stated in his dissent: 
We have then between the focus districts and the comparison 
districts a tale of two worlds: the focus districts beset with 
problems, and lacking anything that can reasonably be called 
an adequate education for many of their children, the com-
parison districts maintaining proper and adequate educa-
tional standards and moving their students toward graduation 
and employment with learned skills necessary to achieve in 
postgraduate education and function in the modern work-
place.189
                                                                                                                      
cation. In Doe v. Superintendent of Schools of Worcester, decided after McDuffy but before Han-
cock, the court declared, “McDuffy should not be construed as holding that the Massachu-
setts Constitution guarantees each individual student the fundamental right to an educa-
tion.” 653 N.E.2d 1088, 1095 (Mass. 1995). 
185 See Hancock, 822 N.E.2d at 1165 (Greaney, J., dissenting); id. at 1173, 1175 (Ireland, 
J., dissenting). 
186 See id. at 1165 (Greaney, J., dissenting); id. at 1174 (Ireland, J., dissenting). 
187 See id. at 1168–69 (Greaney, J., dissenting); id. at 1174 (Ireland, J., dissenting). 
188 Id. at 1169 (Greaney, J., dissenting). Justice Greaney noted: 
As the only remaining member of the court who participated in [McDuffy] 
and as the single justice who has supervised these proceedings over several 
years, I write separately for the following reasons: to emphasize the nature 
and rule of the McDuffy case; to point out again the crisis that exists in the 
four focus districts before us; to explain how the court can and should remain 
involved in the proceedings without impermissibly intruding on legislative or 
executive prerogatives; and to express regret that the court has chosen to ig-
nore the principles of stare decisis, thereby effectively abandoning one of its 
major constitutional precedents. 
Id. at 1165. 
189 Id. at 1168. 
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 In contrast, according to the plurality of the court, good progress 
was being made in Massachusetts schools.190 These justices applauded 
what might be termed the legislature’s early adopter approach to edu-
cation reform in MERA.191 The increased state appropriations for edu-
cation, a revised system for funding local schools and the test-driven, 
standards-based reform and accountability requirements serve as the 
cornerstones for the Hancock adequacy determination.192
 The Hancock decision marked the intersection of legislative and 
judge-based education reform.193 This combination of standards-based 
reform and the adequacy litigation movement, described by some 
commentators as the “perfect storm,” ended in Massachusetts with a 
judicial whimper.194 The meaning and long-term ramiªcations of the 
Hancock decision, particularly given the current condition of education 
in Massachusetts, requires that education reformers assess the future 
direction of efforts to use litigation or legislation to improve educa-
tional opportunities. Do MERA and the Hancock decision set forth the 
standards for the operation of an educational system that will lead to 
the provision of fair and meaningful opportunity to learn while amelio-
rating the current troubling condition of education in Massachusetts? 
Or does social science evidence suggest that there are more potentially 
successful alternatives that would improve access to meaningful educa-
tional opportunities while alleviating achievement deªcits for the most 
at-risk student populations? 
IV. Social Science Research on Adequate  
Educational Opportunities 
 Two prominent education researchers, Richard Elmore and Mil-
brey McLaughlin, asserted in 1988 that education reform has been a 
continuous process in this nation.195 They stated: 
                                                                                                                      
 
190 See Hancock, 822 N.E.2d at 1138 (plurality opinion). 
191 See id. In a previous decision contesting MERA implementation, the court stated 
that “[a]ccording to the department, the school and district accountability system it has 
developed is one of the ªrst in the United States.” Hancock, 822 N.E.2d at 1144 (quoting 
Hancock Report, supra note 62, at *14). 
192 Id. at 1138–39. 
193 See id. at 1157–58. 
194 See John Charles Boger, Education’s “Perfect Storm”? Racial Resegregation, High-Stakes 
Testing, and School Resource Inequities: The Case of North Carolina, 81 N.C. L. Rev. 1375, 1375–
76 (2003). 
195 Richard F. Elmore & Milbrey Wallin McLaughlin, Steady Work: Policy, Prac-
tice, and the Reform of American Education 1 (1988). Another set of prominent com-
mentators referred to the process as a constant “tinkering” toward a utopian educational 
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[R]eform can originate in any of three ways: (1) changes in 
professionals’ view of effective practice, (2) changes in admin-
istrators’ perceptions of how to manage competing demands 
and how to translate these demands into structure and proc-
ess, and (3) changes in policymakers’ views of what citizens 
demand that result in authoritative decisions.196
Looking at the outcome in Hancock with regards to Elmore and 
McLaughlin’s factors, and with particular consideration of recent social 
science research on effective educational practice, offers insight on the 
conditions required to provide a fair and meaningful opportunity to 
learn for all students. While there is still much research to be done, so-
cial scientists know more than they did even in 1993 about how to edu-
cate students successfully.197 There is also a growing body of evidence 
about how educators respond to external mandates like MERA and 
NCLB.198 However, as Professor Elmore has noted more recently: 
[P]olicymakers have shown a willingness to ignore expert ad-
vice [in their contemporary efforts to implement education 
reform]. All of the problems that are present in NCLB were 
accurately predicted and fully deªned by a series of studies 
commissioned by the National Research Council speciªcally 
to inform the reauthorization of [NCLB]. Sometimes the po-
litical logic of reforms undermines their essential purposes.199
 So what does the social research say about the provision of op-
portunity to learn and efforts to promote education reform through 
the use of accountability? To what extent has the use of law-based 
education reform signiªcantly changed practices in schools and en-
hanced opportunity to learn, particularly for the most educationally 
at-risk students? Have legislation and judicial decisions addressed the 
fundamental issues identiªed by social science researchers about 
whether our schools have the fundamental capacity to serve all stu-
                                                                                                                      
system. See generally David Tyack & Larry Cuban, Tinkering Towards Utopia: A Century 
of Public School Reform (1995). 
196 Elmore & McLaughlin, supra note 195, at v. 
197 See generally Comm. on Learning Research & Educ. Practice, Nat’l Research 
Council, How People Learn: Bridging Research and Practice 1–5 (M. Suzanne 
Donovan et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter How People Learn] (synthesizing the literature 
on learning and the relationship between cognitive science research ªndings and the pro-
vision of appropriate curriculum and instruction). 
198 See generally social science literature cited throughout Part IV. 
199 Richard F. Elmore, Details, Details, Details, 28 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 315, 317 
(2003) (footnote omitted). 
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dents’ educational needs and to provide a full and meaningful oppor-
tunity to learn? 
 Social science evidence has advanced since the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s Brown decisions in the 1950s and has advanced even more 
dramatically in the past two decades.200 We now know more about the 
impact of funding on the provision of educational opportunity.201 We 
know more about the impact of external mandates concerning cur-
riculum and standards.202 We know more about how people learn.203 
We know more about how to assess what students have learned.204
 There is now substantial evidence that an opportunity to learn is 
based on both a “theory of learning” and “models of teaching and 
schooling.”205 In addition, appropriate “instructional leadership” from 
administrators and teacher leaders is critical.206 We know more about 
what educators need to know and be able to do.207 Furthermore, the 
evidence establishes that appropriate educational opportunity for stu-
dents only exists when there are appropriate and ongoing opportuni-
ties to learn for educators themselves.208 Finally, we know more about 
                                                                                                                      
200 See generally, e.g., How People Learn, supra note 197. 
201 See generally, e.g., Equity and Adequacy in Education Finance, supra note 71. 
202 See, e.g., discussion infra Part IV.B–C. 
203 See generally, e.g., How People Learn, supra note 197. 
204 See generally, e.g., Comm. on Founds. of Assessment, Nat’l Research Council, 
Knowing What Students Know: The Science and Design of Educational Assessment 
( James W. Pellegrino et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter Knowing What Students Know]. This 
attempt by the National Research Council to synthesize the literature on learning and as-
sessment concluded that current forms of large-scale assessment, such as state testing systems, 
fail to take into account developments in cognitive science and measurement and to provide 
adequate information on how to improve learning opportunities through useful models of 
cognition and learning. See id. at 2–3. 
205 See generally id. at 178–79; Lee S. Shulman & Judith H. Shulman, How and What 
Teachers Learn: A Shifting Perspective, 36 J. Curriculum Stud. 257 (2004). By the phrase 
“theory of learning,” I am referring to frameworks for understanding how people learn, 
and by “models of teaching and schools,” I am referring to devices that provide exemplars 
for how effective educational opportunities are provided. 
206 “Instructional leadership” describes the leadership required from educators to 
promote change in instructional practices. See generally Jo Blase & Joseph Blase, Hand-
book of Instructional Leadership: How Successful Principals Promote Teaching 
and Learning (2d ed. 2004); Linda Darling-Hammond et al., Instructional Leader-
ship for Systemic Change (Francis M. Duffy ed., 2005); Anita Woolfolk Hoy & Wayne 
Kolter Hoy, Instructional Leadership: A Research-Based Guide to Learning in 
Schools (2003); Barbara Scott Nelson & Annette Sassi, The Effective Principal: 
Instructional Leadership for High-Quality Learning (2005). 
207 See generally Linda Darling-Hammond, The Right to Learn: A Blueprint for 
Creating Schools that Work (1997). 
208 See generally David K. Cohen & Heather C. Hill, Learning Policy: When State 
Education Reform Works (2001). 
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capacity building to promote the enhancement of opportunity to learn 
for all students.209 How do these theories and models shed light on ar-
eas upon which the Massachusetts courts focused in the Hancock case? 
Finally, do law-based education reform initiatives sufªciently take the 
social science ªndings into account? 
A. Money Matters, but . . . 
 There is little dispute that, at least temporarily, signiªcant amounts 
of additional state money were provided to low-performing schools in 
Massachusetts as a result of the McDuffy decision and MERA.210 There is 
debate in the social science literature on the extent to which increases 
in funding can improve educational opportunity, though most research-
ers conclude that funding does make a difference.211 What is not in 
dispute is that how increased funding is utilized is as important as the 
presence of new ªnancial resources for students.212
B. Curriculum and Standards 
 For the Massachusetts legislature and a plurality of the Supreme 
Judicial Court, one of the essential conditions for schools to receive 
increased funding was the articulation of curriculum frameworks and 
performance standards for students and schools.213 The MERA provi-
sions reºect legislative assumptions (implicitly shared by NCLB) that 
the declaration of state content standards and testing requirements 
would drive changes in curriculum and instruction at the local school 
level.214 However, these provisions and the assumptions behind them 
are not entirely consistent with the current research literature on how 
                                                                                                                      
209 See generally Richard F. Elmore, School Reform from the Inside Out (2004). 
210 Federal appropriations under NCLB also increased federal funding for Massachu-
setts, although that funding declined somewhat after 2003 due to general decreases in the 
federal education budget. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Funds for State Formula-Allocated 
and Selected Student Aid Programs 51 (2006), available at http://www.ed.gov/about/ 
overview/budget/statetables/07stbystate.pdf. 
211 See Minorini & Sugarman, Educational Adequacy, supra note 71, at 205–07; Michael 
A. Rebell, Adequacy Litigations: A New Path to Equity?, in Bringing Equity Back 291, 292–93 
( Janice Petrovich & Amy Stuart Wells eds., 2005); David K. Cohen et al., Resources, Instruc-
tion, and Research, 25 Educ. Evaluation & Pol’y Analysis 119, 119–21 (2003). But see Eric 
A. Hanushek, The Failure of Input-Based Schooling Policies, 113 Econ. J. F64, F67 (2003) 
(“[L]ittle evidence exists to suggest that any signiªcant changes in student outcomes have 
accompanied [the] growth in resources devoted to schools.”). 
212 See generally Comm. on Educ. Fin., Nat’l Research Council, Making Money 
Matter 1–3 (Helen F. Ladd & Janet S. Hansen eds., 1999). 
213 See discussion supra Parts II.B, III.B.2. 
214 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
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education reform occurs.215 A growing line of policy research on re-
sponses to external state or federal mandates for school reform has 
demonstrated that these mandates do have an impact to some extent, 
but they often do not provoke widespread change, particularly for at-
risk students.216 Some recent efforts to assess directly the impact of 
external mandates for standards-based reforms demonstrate that sim-
ply articulating standards and then holding schools accountable will 
not work.217 External mandates fail to work because standards-based 
reform presumes rationality in schools and classrooms and in the way 
they respond to external mandates about either curriculum or in-
struction.218 The failure of these mandates has been described in vari-
ous ways. Sometimes external mandates do not succeed because 
autonomous local educators fail to attend to external mandates that 
are inconsistent with their own interests and agendas.219 Some exter-
nal mandates fail because educators do not know what to do to ad-
dress the mandates successfully.220
 However, more recent implementation research, such as the work 
of Professor James Spillane and others, suggests a “cognitive ac-
count.”221 Based on the premise that local ofªcials’ responses to policy 
will depend on how they make sense of that policy, these methods of 
implementation may not match the responses that policymakers desire 
because of these policymakers’ perspective and tendency to select the 
                                                                                                                      
215 See, e.g., Cohen & Hill, supra note 208; Richard F. Elmore, Getting to Scale with Good 
Educational Practice, 66 Harv. Educ. Rev. 1, 15–17 (1996); Jane Hannaway, Accountability, As-
sessment, and Performance Issues: We’ve Come a Long Way . . . or Have We?, in American Educa-
tional Governance on Trial, supra note 76, at 20, 25–30; Robert L. Linn, Accountability: 
Responsibility and Reasonable Expectations, 32 Educ. Researcher 3, 3–4, 10 (2003). 
216 See Fuhrman, supra note 43, at 5–8. See generally Susan M. Wilson, California 
Dreaming: Reforming Mathematics Education (2003). Much of this research has been 
ªnanced by the U.S. Department of Education and major foundations such as the Consor-
tium for Policy Research in Education (CPRE). For more information on the CPRE, visit 
http://www.cpre.org. 
217 See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 216; Margaret E. Goertz, Standards-Based Accountability: 
Horse Trade or Horse Whip?, in From the Capitol to the Classroom, supra note 43, at 39, 
54–55. 
218 See, e.g., James P. Spillane, Challenging Instruction for “All Students”: Policy, Practitioners, 
and Practice, in From the Capitol to the Classroom, supra note 43, at 217, 220–21, 235–38. 
219 See Elmore & McLaughlin, supra note 195, at 48–50; James P. Spillane, Stan-
dards Deviation: How Schools Misunderstand Education Policy 5 (2004); see also 
Arthur E. Wise, Legislated Learning 47–87 (1979) (arguing that education reform 
policies fail because the goals of various policymaking entities conºict and because their 
mandates are divorced from the realities of the classroom). 
220 Elmore, supra note 209. 
221 E.g., Spillane, supra note 219, at 7. 
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cues and signals that make sense to them.222 Policy implementation is 
like the “telephone game,” with opportunities for the message to be-
come garbled each time it is passed down from one level to the next.223 
What results is honest misunderstanding rather than willful attempts to 
adapt policy to local needs.224
 What happens at the local school is the key to success in educa-
tion reform and to determining whether or not a constitutional duty 
to provide meaningful learning opportunities is being met. When 
state policy or new ideas about teaching and learning are presented, 
what matters most in implementation is what local educators come to 
understand about their practice from the standards they are given.225 
Quite often, what state-level policymakers seek is not the same as what 
local educators understand as their duty under state legislation, a 
situation resulting in only partial implementation of state policies.226
 Researchers have demonstrated that local educators do pay atten-
tion to what state policies mandate.227 However, Spillane’s work shows 
that state standards have had only limited success in implementation 
at the local level.228 Some teachers will fundamentally change their 
practice, which is “proof that policy, under the right conditions, can 
enable teachers to make fundamental changes to their practice.”229 
To Professor Spillane, the key challenge then becomes how to design 
policies that allow local educators to understand what should be im-
plemented.230
 But even the best combination of policy tools will not be 
sufªcient in helping local educators know what or how to do what 
needs to be done unless they have the knowledge, skills, and disposi-
tions to do what needs to be done and curriculum standards are ap-
propriately deªned.231 In her study of efforts to implement curricu-
lum reform in mathematics in California, Professor Susan Wilson 
writes that mathematics curricula are so insufªcient and so widely dif-
fused that they will not bring students to a high level of achieve-
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ment.232 As a result, mathematics continues to be taught convention-
ally and traditionally and students are not exposed to the content 
knowledge or pedagogy they need for meaningful mathematics at-
tainment.233 She concludes that the weakness of curriculum standards 
causes the most harm to at-risk students from minority and low-
income families, and that this debility results in student socioeco-
nomic status becoming the critical factor in whether or not students 
learn mathematics.234
 Other researchers have concluded that the curriculum and learn-
ing goals fostered by systems like the MCAS result in limiting the 
scope and depth of the overall curriculum. Essentially, educators nar-
row their instruction to teach only to the content of items covered on 
the state examinations because they struggle to cope in the face of 
high-stakes sanctions for themselves, their schools, and their stu-
dents.235
C. Theories of Learning and Models of Teaching 
 The emerging consensus among many social scientists about ef-
forts to improve educational opportunity also relies heavily upon recent 
developments in the cognitive and sociocultural sciences and research 
on the impact of the implementation of more recent education reform 
initiatives concerning classroom practices. A series of projects at the 
National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences has 
synthesized the research on teaching, learning, and testing in the con-
text of standards-based, high-stakes education reform initiatives.236 
These projects have compiled research and offered caution for policy-
making and practice, as well as suggestions for additional research to 
more fully understand the impact of policy and practice on the provi-
sion of opportunities to learn.237 The studies point out the failure of 
current educational practices to incorporate recent developments in 
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cognitive science regarding how students learn as well as the failure of 
current large-scale standardized testing programs to take into account 
recent scientiªc developments in measurement, teaching, and learn-
ing.238
 There are other efforts to synthesize social science evidence to 
promote educational opportunities. A research project sponsored by 
the Spencer Foundation, one of the nation’s largest private sources of 
funding for education research, sought to advance understanding of 
the relationship between testing practices and the provision of a 
meaningful opportunity to learn for all students.239 The project was a 
cross-disciplinary dialogue among some of the nation’s most promi-
nent educational researchers and theorists.240 Participants in the pro-
ject agreed that, historically, assessment practices have played a sig-
niªcant role in the ampliªcation of inequality.241 They concluded that 
breaking the cycle of inequality in the contemporary educational con-
text requires a new way of thinking about both assessment practices 
and instructional approaches.242 These researchers synthesized their 
individual research ªndings and agreed that the provision of a mean-
ingful opportunity to learn requires a different perspective on the re-
lationship between tests and learning and the better utilization of ex-
isting knowledge demonstrating that the unacceptable relationship 
between social class and educational performance can be miti-
gated.243
D. Outcomes Measures for Education Reform 
 Despite the evidence from social scientists about the conditions 
required to provide fair and meaningful opportunity to learn, policy-
makers at both the state and federal levels have invested heavily in the 
use of test-driven accountability systems like MCAS to improve educa-
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tion performance.244 This investment arises in part because of a deeply 
ingrained belief on the part of policymakers that quantiªcation is a use-
ful policy tool, and that testing is a powerful and positive social policy 
tool for changing schools.245 Policymakers and the public also increas-
ingly rely on test scores as evidence of the impact of education reform 
initiatives.246 Judge Botsford and the justices on the Hancock court cer-
tainly relied on test scores to judge the effectiveness of education re-
forms.247 Yet there is a hearty debate among education researchers 
about the value of test-driven education reform approaches.248 Simi-
larly, there is a discussion among traditional civil rights advocates about 
the same issues.249 However, while some civil rights advocates view test-
based education reform as the best hope for improving educational 
opportunities for minority children, some social science commentators 
have stated that “beliefs and practices informed by [the use of standard-
ized testing] have become so deeply ingrained in the American educa-
tional system that it has become difªcult to see them as choices arising 
in particular sociocultural circumstances or to imagine that things 
could be otherwise.”250 Thus, some social scientists assert that the use 
of high-stakes testing should be reconsidered because testing designed 
to motivate accountability can have a negative impact on reform.251
 One negative impact of the reliance on testing to drive education 
reform is that testing has diverted attention that would otherwise be 
paid to developing curriculum standards and building the capacity of 
local schools to engage in meaningful improvements.252 Elmore be-
lieves this shift in focus occurs because, 
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when left to their own devices, . . . [accountability policies] 
drift toward emphasis on testing as the primary instrument, 
and to de-emphasize standards and capacity-building. The 
reasons for this are clear: testing is relatively cheap; the less 
sophisticated the test, the cheaper it is. . . . 
 . . . [NCLB] rewards schools and school systems essentially 
for gaming the test, rather than for setting high and challeng-
ing standards and using testing and human investment to-
gether as strategies for improving quality and performance.253
The testing industry’s own standards of professional practice caution 
against overreliance on test scores when making signiªcant determi-
nations in education.254 These standards require evidence that when 
test scores are used, they provide a valid and reliable measure of per-
formance.255 Robert Linn, one of the nation’s preeminent experts on 
educational testing, concluded: 
[I]n most cases the instruments and technology have not been 
up to the demands that have been placed on them by high-
stakes accountability. Assessment systems that are useful moni-
tors lose much of their dependability and credibility for that 
purpose when high stakes are attached to them. The unin-
tended negative effects of the high-stakes accountability uses of-
ten outweigh the intended positive effects.256
By shifting resources away from curriculum reform and other effec-
tive changes, high-stakes testing may do more harm that good.257
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 High-stakes testing may also have an impact on dropout rates, 
and those rates may then be used to punish low-performing schools. 
While school dropouts have long been a problem, researchers have 
found evidence that the pressures associated with high-stakes testing 
can result in more students leaving school than might otherwise be 
expected.258 Yet, Both NCLB and MERA endorse sanctions for schools 
with low test scores or high dropout rates.259 Commentators have re-
ferred to this process as “naming and shaming.”260 While these sanc-
tions have been characterized as making “intuitive sense,” there is lit-
tle available research to support the approach.261 The research found 
that sanctions have relatively limited success in promoting meaningful 
opportunity to learn.262 In part, educators who regard the approach 
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as unfair, invalid, and unrealistic are not motivated by the imposition 
of sanctions.263
E. Educator Qualities 
 Efforts to change educational opportunity by deªning state-wide 
curriculum frameworks depend in part on the capabilities of local 
educators to implement the new curriculum.264 Judge Botsford’s re-
port to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Hancock noted 
that the Massachusetts Commissioner of Education regarded educator 
quality as the critical variable in education reform.265 This perspective 
is supported by a growing consensus in both social science and public 
policy literature.266 For many education researchers, particularly those 
who have studied recent attempts to implement state-mandated stan-
dards-based reforms, educator quality and the provision of an oppor-
tunity to learn for educators themselves is the factor most critical to 
the success of current education reform.267
 Most of MERA’s educator quality provisions focus on the creden-
tials awarded to teachers and requirements that local districts provide 
professional development activities for teachers.268 These provisions 
relate to what NCLB and MERA describe as criteria for determining 
                                                                                                                      
263 See Mintrop, supra note 260. 
264 See, e.g., Darling-Hammond, supra note 207, at 229–32; Elmore, supra note 209. 
265 See supra text accompanying note 109. 
266 See, e.g., Cohen & Hill, supra note 208; Darling-Hammond, supra note 207, at 69–
71; Chester E. Finn, Jr. et al., The Quest for Better Teachers 1–2 (1999), available at 
http://www.edexcellence.net/doc/quest.pdf; Richard J. Murnane et al., Who Will 
Teach? 1–2 (1991). 
267 See Cohen & Hill, supra note 208, at 185; see also Elmore, supra note 209, at 130 
(“Professional development is at the center of the practice of improvement.”). 
268 In order to be certiªed as a “provisional educator,” Massachusetts law requires the 
following of its teachers: 
[T]he candidate shall (1) hold a bachelor’s degree in arts or sciences from an 
accredited college or university with a major course in the arts or sciences ap-
propriate to the instructional ªeld; (2) pass a test established by the board 
which shall consist of two parts: (A) a writing section which shall demonstrate 
the communication and literacy skills necessary for effective instruction and 
improved communication between school and parents; and (B) the subject 
matter knowledge for the certiªcate; and (3) be of sound moral character. 
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 38G (2004). Massachusetts also requires that school districts 
develop plans for professional development activities for teachers. See id. ch. 69, § 1I; id. 
ch. 71, § 38Q. 
2007] Ensuring an Adequate Education 123 
whether an individual is a “highly qualiªed teacher.”269 The creden-
tialing process relies heavily upon testing and subject matter knowl-
edge to deªne educator quality.270
 However, recent social science research stresses the importance 
of focusing on the qualities effective educators possess rather than the 
paper qualiªcations they hold. Consistent with the intent (although 
not necessarily the adopted provisions) of some education reforms, 
cognitive scientists and researchers on policy implementation agree 
that good teachers possess a deep and complex level of subject matter 
expertise.271 These scientists have found that expertise cannot neces-
sarily be measured by successful passage of teacher competency tests 
used under MERA or NCLB.272 Instead, social science studies describe 
successful educators as having certain qualities such as deep, struc-
tural understanding of subject matter content accompanied by peda-
gogic skills and dispositions that enable students to understand the 
subject matter.273 Furthermore, research indicates that well-qualiªed 
teachers must be “ready, willing, and able to teach and to learn from 
[their own] teaching experiences.”274
 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s endorsement of 
teacher competency testing is consistent with widely embraced reform 
efforts, such as those articulated in NCLB.275 However, many education 
researchers have soundly criticized teacher competency tests currently 
in use and presented questions about the defensibility of teacher cer-
tiªcation requirements.276
 Research indicates that state policy can change teaching practices 
to some extent, but the key to meaningful reform is linking clearly 
                                                                                                                      
269 See 20 U.S.C.A. § 7801(23) (West 2003) (deªning a “highly qualiªed” teacher for 
purposes of NCLB); see also id. §§ 6319(a), 6613(c) (imposing responsibility on states for 
ensuring that local schools employ highly qualiªed teachers). 
270 See supra note 268. 
271 See, e.g., How People Learn, supra note 197, at 2, 16; see also Lee S. Shulman, 
Knowledge and Teaching: Foundations of the New Reform, 57 Harv. Educ. Rev. 1, 20 (1987) 
(stressing the importance of “pedagogic content knowledge,” described as the capacity to 
exercise teaching pedagogies speciªcally appropriate to a particular content area). 
272 See sources cited supra note 271. 
273 See, e.g., How People Learn, supra note 197, at 2, 16; Shulman & Shulman, supra 
note 205, at 259. 
274 Shulman & Shulman, supra note 205, at 259 (emphasis partially omitted). 
275 See supra text accompanying notes 31–42. 
276 See, e.g., Comm. on Assessment & Teacher Quality, Nat’l Research Council, 
Testing Teacher Candidates: The Role of Licensure Tests in Improving Teacher 
Quality 115, 121–22 (Karen J. Mitchell et al. eds., 2001); Susan L. Melnick & Diana Pullin, 
Can You Take Dictation? Prescribing Teacher Quality Through Testing, 51 J. Tchr. Educ. 262, 264 
(2000); Pullin, supra note 115, at 384, 386. 
124 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 27:83 
deªned curriculum and instructional content to long-term, ongoing, 
and in-depth professional development.277 States must provide oppor-
tunities for educators to learn in order to be prepared in both subject 
content and pedagogy.278 Only then will schools provide their stu-
dents with meaningful educational opportunities.279 When the State 
calls for substantial changes in local school practices, the real key to 
reform is a consistent approach that provides meaningful opportuni-
ties to learn for educators themselves.280
 The use of curriculum frameworks can be helpful to educators, 
but only if they are accompanied by a broad range of suggested edu-
cational practices, textbook content, and thoughtful teacher analysis 
of students’ needs.281 State efforts to augment teaching and learning 
in a high-stakes testing program only work when teachers are pro-
vided with signiªcant professional development opportunities such 
that they can learn how improve their teaching abilities within their 
respective subject areas.282 The more learning opportunities teachers 
have, the more their students learn, at least as measured by state test 
scores.283 One commentator concludes that it takes about ten years of 
sustained professional development to turn even a knowledgeable 
and well-qualiªed novice teacher into the type of seasoned profes-
sional who can attend to the individual educational needs of all stu-
dents.284 Furthermore, social science research has demonstrated the 
importance of leadership in schools, particularly on the part of school 
principals, to create a culture of reform.285 Perhaps most important, 
according to the literature, is the role of the school principal in lead-
ing the improvement of instruction and learning.286
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F. It’s Capacity that Really Counts 
 One legal commentator has noted that the “unaccountable school 
district” has long been a feature of American public education.287 But 
the real locus of education reform is at the local school level; therefore, 
state efforts to provide education can only be meaningful if the focus is 
on local schools and districts.288 Many local-level educators in schools 
have worked diligently to implement the new systems and meet ac-
countability standards. However, Professor Elmore has suggested that 
many educators simply do not know what to do for their students since, 
if they did know what to do, they would do it.289 Simply setting an ex-
ternal standard does not guarantee improved student performance.290
 Researchers studying schools operating under standards-based 
reform mandates found the following: 
[If] state accountability policies are based on the working the-
ory that external pressure for performance is designed to 
mobilize existing capacity, rather than to create new capacity, 
then it is possible that the long-term effect of accountability 
policies, other things being equal, could be to increase the 
gap in performance between high and low capacity schools. 
The relative absence in our case studies of evidence of delib-
erate, systematic efforts to inºuence capacity by states and lo-
calities makes this a troubling issue.291
These researchers concluded that policymakers suffer from a miscon-
ception if they believe that external mandates determine how schools 
and districts will act.292 Schools respond differently to external ac-
countability, depending on their initial capabilities and circum-
stances.293
 Based on signiªcant studies on the implementation of externally 
mandated, standards-based accountability systems, researchers have 
concluded that meaningful education reform requires capacity.294 Ca-
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pacity is deªned by a combination of several factors and their com-
plex relationship, such as: 
• How much teachers know about their subject area as well as their 
pedagogic skill in bringing students to an appropriate level of un-
derstanding (the key element of capacity).295 
• Internal accountability of “shared norms, values, expectations, 
structures, and processes” working coherently to achieve ambitious 
goals for student learning (particularly difªcult to achieve in high 
schools).296 
• Leadership, not only by administrators, but throughout the school 
and school system.297 
• Resources (time, money, information, materials, external sup-
port).298 
 If schools “try to respond to external pressure by doing what they 
are already doing at a higher level of efªciency and effectiveness[, they] 
typically don’t produce substantial improvements in either practice or 
performance.”299 At present, capacities to provide full and meaningful 
opportunity to learn vary widely in existing schools.300 Most frequently, 
according to this research, it is the low-performing schools that are the 
most cautious about change, the most intimidated, and the most risk-
averse because of their low performance in the past.301
 The considerable variation in capacity among schools, particu-
larly in schools serving poor and minority children, is due in part to 
teacher beliefs. Many teachers in low-performing schools simply reject 
or ignore reforms, do not know what to do, or do not believe that 
they can do anything that will cause change. Teachers’ low expecta-
tions for at-risk students can be overcome by implementing appropri-
ate pedagogical methods and allowing teachers to receive the feed-
back that they can in fact make a difference in achievement for these 
students. Otherwise, teachers often narrow teaching to cover only the 
content of state assessment tests.302 As one researcher concluded, “En-
suring that all students have comparable learning opportunities is 
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perhaps the most politically challenging issue that states face.”303 A 
focus on equalizing capacity would be a step toward providing mean-
ingful learning opportunities. 
 Every student, including the most vulnerable, should have a fair 
and meaningful opportunity to learn an important and challenging 
curriculum, such as the curriculum that would lead to the McDuffy out-
comes.304 The most fundamental educational issue for state policymak-
ers and judges considering a state constitution’s education clause 
should be how to provide this opportunity to all students. Unfortu-
nately, in the face of almost overwhelming evidence of continued low 
performance among the most at-risk students in the most resource-
poor schools, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court determined 
that the State was meeting its constitutional duty to educate.305
V. The Role of Law in Ensuring the Provision of a Fair and 
Meaningful Opportunity to Learn 
 Research literature conªrms that, as Justice Marshall put it, the 
problem with the progress of education reform is that it is “painfully 
slow.”306 But the speed of implementation may be only part of the 
challenge of improving schools. Social science evidence demonstrates 
that the reform mandates of MERA will not thoroughly and effectively 
reform the delivery of educational opportunities to students most at 
risk of failure anytime soon, or perhaps at all. The achievement gap 
between white and minority children and between afºuent and poor 
children persists.307 Many educators have reformed their practices, 
but current legislative mandates for reform and inadequate ªnancial 
support limit the chances to achieve the changes required. What does 
this say about our constitutional premise that the State has a duty to 
“cherish” education? 
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 The MERA mandates were not based on educational theories 
much more sophisticated than the assumption that if you test certain 
content, educators will teach it and sanctions will motivate recalcitrant 
educators and students to improve their performance. The MERA 
framers seemed to assume that educators and students needed to be 
told what to learn and to try harder. The Massachusetts legislature 
showed zeal for imposing standards-driven, high-stakes accountabil-
ity,308 and the Supreme Judicial Court later accepted that approach in 
Hancock.309 As a result, the Commonwealth has foregone the oppor-
tunity to implement deeply meaningful and effective approaches that 
would have a greater likelihood of ensuring a fair and meaningful 
opportunity to learn for all students. 
 Judge Botsford’s comments on educator quality and the impor-
tance of the role of the school principal come closer than most court 
decisions, or legislation for that matter, in articulating an understand-
ing of the characteristics needed to provide this opportunity to learn.310 
She did not have before her most of the research evidence discussed 
here, so many of Judge Botsford’s proposed ªndings and conclusions 
fail to incorporate recent social science evidence. The plurality opinion 
in Hancock paid little attention to the conditions necessary for effective 
education services, instead favoring the right of the legislature to make 
all decisions regarding implementation of the constitutional duty to 
educate.311 Judge Botsford clearly saw a role for legislators in designing 
education reforms and for judges in overseeing the creation and en-
actment of improvements by education experts and public ofªcials.312 
On the other hand, Chief Justice Marshall, writing for a plurality of the 
Supreme Judicial Court, saw only controversy among education experts 
about how to conduct education as well as a set of value judgments 
about schooling in which courts should not be involved.313
Conclusion 
 The low performance of poor and minority students in Massa-
chusetts was predictable or perhaps even inevitable, given that the re-
forms endorsed by social science research have not been adopted by 
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the state legislature in favor of standards-driven, high-stakes testing. 
As a result, the achievement gap will likely continue and may, in fact, 
worsen. Most efforts to use law to improve educational opportunities 
for at-risk students fail to consider, or constructively inºuence, the 
local-level conditions necessary for effective teaching and learning. 
Thus far, state legal and legislative action has neglected to implement 
strategies demonstrated by social science literature to provide mean-
ingful opportunity to learn. 
 As more and more schools fall into the underperforming cate-
gory, might the Supreme Judicial Court be persuaded that the duty to 
cherish education is no longer being met? Early in her plurality opin-
ion, Chief Justice Marshall reiterated language from McDuffy that it is 
the ongoing responsibility of state ofªcials to meet the duty to cherish 
education. She stated: 
Nothing I say today would insulate the Commonwealth from 
a successful challenge under the education clause in differ-
ent circumstances. The framers recognized that “the content 
of the duty to educate . . . will evolve together with our soci-
ety,” and that the education clause must be interpreted “in 
accordance with the demands of modern society or it will be 
in constant danger of becoming atrophied and, in fact, may 
even lose its meaning.”314
Perhaps in the face of ongoing performance problems, the most re-
cent social science research will eventually persuade a future court to 
reconsider these matters in a new wave of school ªnance litigation. If 
it happens at all, will the next phase of adequacy lawsuits or the next 
revision of state or federal legislation successfully address conditions 
required for effective teaching and learning as described by recent 
social science research? 
 Massachusetts has foregone the opportunity to adequately ad-
dress the conditions for providing a fair and meaningful opportunity 
to learn for students, particularly those most at risk of failure. Thus, 
some of the answers to the key questions of education policy enumer-
ated at the start of this article remain unchanged, at least for the mo-
ment, in Massachusetts. The watershed year of 1993 did result in new 
declarations of the desired outcomes of education, the content of the 
curriculum, and, at least for a time, commitments to increase state 
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funding to low-wealth local schools. However, as to the question of 
who decides issues of education policy, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court has clearly decided that issue now rests exclusively in 
the hands of the legislature. Yet in the face of substantial develop-
ments in the research evidence about how to provide meaningful op-
portunities to learn, the state falls far short of meeting the goal of pro-
viding the conditions and resources, or capacities, needed to educate 
all our future citizens effectively. Failure to remedy these severe edu-
cational shortcomings in light of available advances in knowledge 
about how to do so will surely have a detrimental impact on the social, 
economic, and civic future of Massachusetts. We have either reached 
the limits of law-based education reform or we have reached the be-
ginning of the next phase of law-based education reform. Perhaps we 
will soon enter an era in which elected ofªcials will reconsider how to 
structure learning conditions or where courts will determine that our 
collective understanding of the duty to educate has, as Chief Justice 
Marshall put it, indeed evolved, such that new obligations will arise 
that impart new meaning to our duty to cherish education. 
 Even if legislatures or judges can agree on a course correction in 
efforts to reform schools and craft approaches fully informed by what 
educators need to help all students achieve at high levels, some key ques-
tions of education policy remain. Educating students to high standards of 
achievement in meaningful content knowledge is complex, highly tech-
nical, and expensive. If we attain some level of consensus concerning the 
key issues of educational policy, who should pay for these endeavors? Are 
we all, collectively, willing to pay to educate other people’s children and 
to educate them well? What role will law, either legislated or judge-made, 
play in responding to recent scientiªc developments and in determining 
the educational success of all our children? 
